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Connecticut v. Teal: The Supreme Court's Latest
Exposition of Disparate Impact Analysis
Jane Rigler *
When the Supreme Court announced its decision in Connecticut v.
Teal,' it may have provided the final impetus for significant change
in employment decision-making. The Court concluded that use of a
written examination which has a disparate impact on black candi-
dates in the promotion process constitutes a prima facie case of a
Title VII violation, even though the ultimate promotion decisions do
not result in overall underrepresentation of blacks. Furthermore, an
employer's favorable "bottom line" statistics will not provide a valid
defense to such a prima facie showing. Because Teal subjects each
component of a selection process to challenge and review, employers
should now be extremely reluctant to rely on criteria which have not
been established as job-related in making their employment
decisions.
More than ten years ago, the Supreme Court held that facially
neutral employment tests which have a substantially disparate im-
pact on members of minority groups constitute prima facie evidence
of a Title VII violation. 2 Teal's holding that an employer risks suit
even though he sought to ameliorate the disparate impact by ulti-
mately hiring or promoting blacks in proportion to their representa-
tion in the work force effectively forecloses employers' use of any
tests. This article will analyze Teal and discuss its implications for
future litigation, focusing on the new conceptual approach to Title
VII which the Court's decision suggests.
I. The Teal Decision
Employees of the State of Connecticut's Department of Income
Maintenance brought the lawsuit in Teal. Each employee had been
provisionally promoted to the position of welfare eligibility supervi-
sor and had served in that capacity for almost two years.3 In order to
* Professor of Law, Dickinson School of Law. B.A. 1972, University of Iowa; J.D. 1975,
Florida State University; LL.M. 1978, New York University.
1 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
2 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
3 457 U.S. at 442-43.
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attain the permanent status of supervisor, Connecticut mandated
participation in a selection process which required, as a first step, a
passing score on a written examination.4 Of the candidates who
identified themselves as black, 54.17% passed the exam while 79.54%
of the white candidates passed. Thus, the blacks' passing rate was
68% of the whites'. None of the plaintiffs passed the exam.5
In promoting its employees, the department considered past
work performance, recommendations of the candidates' supervisors,
and seniority. 6 Additionally, in order to ensure that a significant
number of welfare eligibility supervisors were members of minority
groups, the department utilized an "affirmative action" plan. 7 This
procedure resulted in the final selection of eleven blacks (22.9% of the
black candidates) and thirty-five whites (13.5% of the white candi-
dates). The actual promotion rate of blacks was therefore almost
170% of the actual promotion rate of whites.8
At trial,9 the plaintiffs based their allegation of a Title VII viola-
tion on both the disparate impact and disparate treatment theories of
discrimination.10 The United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut concluded there was no evidence of an intent to discrim-
inate and thus no disparate treatment.' Using the four-fifths rule' 2
to determine impact, the court found that although the comparative
passing rates for the exam indicated a prima facie case of adverse
impact on blacks, the entire promotion process reflected no discrimi-




8 Id. at 444 & n.6.
9 The district court's opinion is not officially reported, but the Memorandum of Deci-
sion from the court was appended to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari. Petition for Cert.
app. 18a, Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
10 Id at 2la-22a. The disparate treatment theory involves allegations that the employer
"simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can. . . be inferred
from the mere fact of differences in treatment." International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (citations omitted). The disparate impact theory
involves "employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups
but. . . in fact fall more harshly on one group than another. . . . Proof of discriminatory
motive. . . is not required under a disparate impact theory." Id.
11 Petition for Cert. app. 18a, Teal.
12 The rule provides that "[a] selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less
than four-fifths (4/5)(or eighty percent) of the rate for the group with the highest rate will
generally be regarded . . . as evidence of adverse impact." 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4D (1982).
Courts are not bound by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Guidelines, but the
Supreme Court has said that they should be given "great deference." Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
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nation.' 3 Because the court concluded that the bottom line percent-
ages precluded the finding of a Title VII violation, the court held
that the employer was not required to demonstrate the exam's job-
relatedness.1 4 The plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, which reversed the district court,
stating that when "an identifiable pass-fail barrier denies an employ-
ment opportunity to a disproportionately large number of minorities
and prevents them from proceeding to the next step in the selection
process," the barrier must be job-related.'
5
Justice Brennan wrote the decision for the five-member
Supreme Court majority.' 6 The question before the Court, accord-
ing to Justice Brennan, was "whether an examination that bars a
disparate number of black employees from consideration for promo-
tion, and that has not been shown to be job related, presents a claim
cognizable under Title VII.'
17
The majority founded its analysis on section 703(a) (2)18 of Title
VII, as well as its 1971 decision in Gn'ggs v. Duke Power Co. '9 Reaf-
firming Griggs, the Court stated that a plaintiff must demonstrate
that the facially neutral employment practice had a significantly dis-
criminatory impact. If the plaintiff makes this showing, a prima fa-
cie case is established, and the "employer must then demonstrate
that 'any given requirement [has] a manifest relationship to the em-
ployment in question' in order to avoid a finding of discrimina-
13 Petition for Cert. app. 18a, Teal.
14 Once a prima facie case of discriminatory impact has been established, the employer
must demonstrate that the requirement is job-related in order to avoid a finding of discrimi-
nation. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432. The plaintiff may still prevail if he or she shows that the
employer was using the practice as a pretext for discrimination. Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975). Validation of tests is a very expensive and time-consuming
process. For one attempt, see Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 630 F.2d 79 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 940 (1981). It has been asserted that an employer "seeking to
validate the job-relatedness of a single employee characteristic such as an arithmetic test for
machinists could expect to incur validation costs ranging from $20,000 to $100,000."
Gwartney, Asher, Haworth & Haworth, Statistics, the Law and Title VII An Eonomists View,
54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 633, 643 (1979).
15 Teal v. Connecticut, 645 F.2d 133, 138 (2d. Cir.), cert. granted, 454 U.S. 831 (1981).
16 Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined in Justice Brennan's majority
opinion.
17 Teal, 457 U.S. at 445.
18 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1976). Section 703(a)(2) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... (2) to limit, segre-
gate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
19 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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tion."'20 The Court recognized that Congress enacted Title VII to
remove the " 'artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to em-
ployment' and professional development that had historically been
encountered by women and blacks as well as other minorities."21
The Court placed particular emphasis on the language of sec-
tion 703(a) (2), stressing that the "statute speaks, not in terms of jobs
and promotions, but in terms of limitations and classiftations that
would deprive any individual of employment opportunities.' '22 Inter-
preting this language, the Court concluded that the use of non-job-
related barriers which deny minorities or women job opportunities,
"ignores the fact that Title VII guarantees these individual respon-
dents the opportunity to compete equally with white workers on the
basis of job-related criteria. ' 23 Thus, the Court rejected the argu-
ment that disparate impact should be measured at the bottom line.
The defendants in Teal had placed substantial reliance on the
Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, which state
that, as a general rule, the EEOC and the Department of Justice will
not take enforcement action based on the disparate impact of any
component of a selection process, so long as the total selection process
results in no adverse impact.24 Yet the Teal Court concluded that
this policy had little significance for determining the issue before it.25
The Court acknowledged that a nondiscriminatory bottom line
might assist an employer in rebutting the inference that it had inten-
tionally discriminated. However, in Teal the employer's intent was
20 Teal, 457 U.S. at 446-47 (citing Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432).
21 Id. at 447 (citing Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431).
22 Id. at 448 (emphasis in original).
23 Id. at 451 (emphasis in original). The State of Connecticut also argued that an accept-
able bottom line should constitute a defense to a prima facie case of discrimination. But the
Court, reaffirming Gn'ggs, held that § 703(h) of the Act permits only tests which are job-
related. The Court stated:
A non-job-related test that has a disparate racial impact, and is used to "limit" or
"classify" employees, is "used to discriminate" within the meaning of Title VII,
whether or not it was "designed or intended" to have this effect and despite an
employer's efforts to compensate for its discriminatory effect.
Teal, 457 U.S. at 452.
24 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1982).
25 457 U.S. at 453 n.12 (citing 43 Fed. Reg. 38291 (1978)). Justice Brennan pointed out
that the
agencies made clear that the "guidelines do not address the underlying question of
law," and that an individual "who is denied the job because of a particular compo-
nent in a procedure which otherwise meets the 'bottom line' standard . . . retains
the right to proceed through the appropriate agencies, and into Federal court."
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not at issue.26 Finally, the Court observed that Title VII was enacted
to protect the individual employee, rather than the minority group as
a whole: "Title VII does not permit the victim of a facially discrimi-
natory policy to be told that he has not been wronged because other
persons of his or her race or sex were hired.
'27
Justice Powell's dissent 28 accused the majority of blurring the
distinction between the disparate treatment and disparate impact
theories.29 Powell opined that the Teal plaintiffs had sought to prove
a violation of Title VII "by reference to group figures," thus they
could not "deny petitioner the opportunity to rebut their evidence by
introducing figures of the same kind. '30 Because there was "no ad-
verse effect on the group" 31 in Teal, Justice Powell asserted that Title
VII was not violated.
32
II. Prior Bottom Line Decisions
The Teal majority gave virtually no consideration to the Court's
earlier decisions which had arguably sanctioned the bottom line
analysis. While they did not deal directly with the issue addressed in
Teal, these decisions had indicated that if employers' work forces re-
26 Id. at 454.
27 Id. at 455. The majority concluded, "[r]equirements and tests that have a discrimina-
tory impact are merely some of the more subtle, but also the more pervasive of the 'practices
and devices which have fostered racially stratified job environments to the disadvantage of
minority citizens.' " Id
28 Chief Justice Burger, Justice Rehnquist, and Justice O'Connor joined Justice Powell
in dissent.
29 Teal, 457 U.S. at 456 (Powell, J., dissenting).
30 Id. at 460.
31 Id.
32 Although there is some appeal to Justice Powell's attack on the majority position, close
scrutiny reveals that his view is inconsistent with the Griggs v. Duke Power Co. precedent. Pow-
ell, however, did not indicate that he favored abandoning Griggs. Griggs was founded upon
the Court's recognition of a pragmatic reality: to require a strict showing of an intention to
discriminate would undermine the purpose of Title VII. Motive and intent are easily dis-
guised. Allegedly neutral selection criteria are often used to accomplish subtle discrimination
on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, or national origin. Moreover, many truly neutral
selection criteria actually deprive individuals of equal employment opportunities simply be-
cause of previous discrimination. Consider, for example, the lingering effects of previous seg-
regation in the nation's schools. Thus, the Gig!s Court allowed an employment practice's
adverse impact on a group to constitute a prima facie case of discrimination. The Teal plain-
tiffs employed this theory to establish their prima facie case.
Additionally, the Court had never directly reviewed a selection process in which only a
part of the process had an adverse impact. Therefore, Powell's assertion that "our disparate
impact cases consistently have considered whether the result of an employer's total selection
process had an adverse impact upon the protected group," 457 U.S. at 458 (Powell, J., dissent-
ing) (emphasis in original), lacks foundation.
[Vol. 59:313]
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flected the racial and sexual composition of their labor markets, vir-
tual immunity from Title VII suits would follow. 33
In 1973, the Court decided Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Co. 34
In Espinoza, a resident alien of the United States challenged an em-
ployer's requirement of American citizenship as a condition for em-
ployment. The Court rejected the plaintiff's argument that
discrimination on the basis of citizenship constituted illegal discrimi-
nation on the basis of national origin, defining "national origin" as
the place from which an individual or his ancestors came. 35 The
Court acknowledged that a citizenship requirement could be used as
a subterfuge for national origin discrimination, but pointed out that
such was not the case in Espinoza since 97 percent of the employees
were of Mexican-American ancestry. 36 The Court failed to consider
whether the employer's rule might have eliminated proportionately
more Mexican-Americans than Caucasians; instead, the Court was
persuaded that because 97 percent of the employees were Mexican-
Americans, this figure-the "bottom line"-precluded finding a Ti-
tle VII violation. The Teal Court did not deem Espinoza relevant.
In General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,37 the Court considered whether a
private employer's nonoccupational disability benefit plan, which ex-
cluded all pregnancy-related disabilities from coverage, violated Ti-
tle VII. Many thought the Gilbert majority's analysis of the disparate
impact issue was also an adoption of the bottom line defense.3, Al-
though excluding pregnancy-related disabilities from coverage would
obviously have a disparate impact on women, the Court concluded
that Title VII had not been violated because the entire fringe benefit
scheme did not have that effect. Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Gil-
bert majority: "As there is no proof that the package is in fact worth
more to men than to women, it is impossible to find any gender-
based discriminatory effect in this scheme simply because women dis-
33 Professor Alfred Blumrosen was the leading proponent of this view. See Blumrosen,
The Bottom Line Concept in Equal Employment Opportunity Law, 12 N.C. CENT. L.J. I (1980). See
also Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in Hih' Places, 95 HARV. L. REV. 947, 954-55
(1982)("The Supreme Court's approval in ... Weber [United Steelworkers of America v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979)] of a race-conscious employment scheme was the logical conse-
quence of the Griggs doctrine. Employers-compelled by Griggs to eschew policies that had
an unnecessary adverse impact on blacks-could not be penalized for adopting policies
designed to ensure that blacks were employed on a proportionate basis.").
34 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
35 Id. at 89.
36 Id. at 92-93.
37 429 U.S. 125 (1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 1079 (1977).
38 See C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER, & R. RICHARDS, FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW OF EM-
PLOYMENT DIscRIMINATION 152 (1980).
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abled as a result of pregnancy do not receive benefits. . .. 39 In
other words, at the bottom line, there was no discriminatory effect,
and therefore no prima facie case. The Teal majority did not even
mention Gilbert.
The third case in which the Supreme Court arguably sanctioned
the bottom line defense was Furnco v. Waters.40 This case employed
both the disparate treatment and disparate impact theories. Black
plaintiffs alleged that they were the victims of intentional racial dis-
crimination because a job superintendent refused to hire them. Ad-
ditionally, they alleged that the employer's practices of refusing to
hire "at the gate," and only hiring individuals known to the superin-
tendent, had a disparate racial impact.4' Nonetheless, the overall
composition of the employer's work force reflected that proportion-
ately more blacks were employed than were represented in the rele-
vant geographic labor market. The Fumco majority considered only
the disparate treatment theory.42 It stated that courts should con-
sider the racial mix of the work force when making a determination
of the employer's motivation.43 Since the appellate court had re-
quired the employer to adopt the "best hiring procedure," the
Supreme Court remanded Fumco so the employer could attempt to
prove that the employment practice at issue was based on a legiti-
mate consideration.
4
Justices Marshall and Brennan concurred and dissented. They
believed that the Fumco majority's failure to consider the disparate
impact issue was a tacit acceptance of the bottom line defense. Jus-
tice Marshall argued that the Court should have explicitly consid-
ered the disparate impact issue, and he asserted that "it is at least an
open question whether the hiring of workers primarily from a list of
past employees would, under Griggs, violate Title VII where the list
contains no Negroes but the company uses additional methods of hir-
ing to increase the number of Negroes hired. ' 45
The Teal majority treated Fumco as a pure disparate treatment
case.46 Teal's conclusion that Connecticut's bottom line afforded it
no protection reflected the Court's judgment that the overall racial
39 429 U.S. at 138.
40 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
41 Id. at 572.
42 Id. at 575.
43 Id. at 571-72, 580.
44 Id. at 577.
45 Id. at 584 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnote omitted).
46 457 U.S. at 454-55.
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mix in an employer's workforce is irrelevant in a disparate impact
case.
In light of these decisions,47 many employers viewed affirmative
action plans as means of avoiding Title VII liability without the ne-
cessity of abandoning tests or other requirements which had dispa-
rate impacts on minorities and women. Teal destroyed this bottom
line protection, however.
III. Application of Teal
The facts presented to the Court in Teal were quite conducive to
the Court's holding that favorable bottom line statistics will not pro-
tect an employer whose employment practices have a discriminatory
disparate impact on women or minorities. In Teal, the statistical dis-
parity between the percentages of whites and blacks who passed the
exam was substantial. Additionally, Connecticut used the exam as
an absolute pass-fail barrier, and thus failure to achieve a passing
score totally eliminated an applicant from consideration. The Teal
plaintiffs had successfully performed the responsibilities of their posi-
tions for at least two years, yet their test performance barred their
further participation in the promotion process. Finally, no white ap-
plicants were challenging the affirmative action plan which pro-
duced the favorable bottom line figures.
What are Teal's implications for more complex factual situa-
tions? If the challenged criterion was some factor other than a writ-
ten examination that resulted in a disparate impact, would the Court
adopt a different analysis? What if the factor causing the disparate
impact did not serve to eliminate a candidate entirely, but rather was
simply one of many considerations in the decisional process? Is the
analysis regarding favorable bottom line statistics the same if only
members of minority groups or women are considered for the avail-
able positions? And how will the Court's emphasis on the individual
affect the lower courts' ability to remedy discrimination? Teal and
prior Title VII decisions provide varying degrees of guidance for an-
swering these questions.
A. Employment Criteria Other Than Examinations
At least three Supreme Court decisions have applied a disparate
impact analysis to criteria which did not involve written exams.
47 In addition to this precedent, the Supreme Court held that race-conscious affirmative




Dothard v. Rawlinson48 (height and weight requirements), New York
Cioy Transit Authority v. Beazer 49 (a ban on methadone users), and
Griggs v. Duke Power Co .50 (high school diploma requirement), all in-
volved application of the disparate impact theory to "facially neu-
tral" employment practices. Yet in Teal, the Court placed no
emphasis whatsoever on the fact that the disparate impact resulted
from a written exam, a facially neutral employment criterion.
51
B. Employment Barriers Which Are Not Absolute
Unlike the Second Circuit's treatment of Teal, which centered
around the pass-fail barrier and thereby enabled the court to distin-
guish several other bottom line cases,5 2 the Supreme Court's majority
opinion did not focus on the exam as an absolute barrier. An em-
ployer-imposed requirement which results in a disparate impact but
does not totally eliminate members of a protected group could arise
in any number of fashions. For example, if an employer were to
make hiring decisions based on combined scores from a written exam
and oral interview, and blacks scored lower than whites on the writ-
ten exam, Teal indicates that the entire hiring procedure could be
successfully challenged.5 3 The discriminatory factor would function
48 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
49 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
50 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
51 See Bartosic & Minda, Labor Law Myth in the Supreme Court, 1981 Term: A Plea for a
Realistic and Coherent Theofy, 30 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 271, 282 (1982).
52 Teal v. Connecticut, 645 F.2d 133, 138-39 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 454 U.S. 831 (1981).
Federal court decisions which apparently accepted the bottom line defense include: EEOC v.
Greyhound Lines, 635 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1980); EEOC v. Navajo Refining Co., 593 F.2d 988
(10th Cir. 1979); Friend v. Leidinger, 588 F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1978); Cormier v. PPG Indus.
Inc., 519 F. Supp. 211 (W.D. La. 1981); Brown v. New Haven Civil Serv. Bd., 474 F. Supp.
1256 (D. Conn. 1979); Lee v. City of Richmond, 456 F. Supp. 756 (E.D. Va. 1978); Kirkland
v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Serv., 374 F. Supp. 1361 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), af'd, 520
F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976). Contra EEOC v. Trailways, Inc., 530
F. Supp. 54 (D. Colo. 1981); League of United Latin American Citizens v. City of Santa Ana,
410 F. Supp. 873 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
53 See Williams v. City of San Francisco, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 885, 887 (N.D.
Cal. 1983); Brown v. New Haven Civil Serv. Bd., 474 F. Supp. 1256, 1262 (D. Conn.
1979)("The fact that test scores are cumulated in an application process would not itself
prevent scrutiny of a component . . . ."); McConnell, Afimative Action after Teal-A New
Twist or a Turn of the Screw?, 7 REGULATION 38, 42 (Mar./Apr. 1983). Justice Powell would
presumably disagree with this conclusion; dissenting in Teal, he noted:
Another possibility is that employers may integrate consideration of test results into
one overall hiring decision based on that 'factor' and additional factors. Such a
process would not, even under the Court's reasoning, result in a finding of discrimi-
nation on the basis of disparate impact unless the actual hiring decisions had a
disparate impact on the minority group.
[Vol. 59:313]
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as a "barrier" to an individual's equal employment "opportunity"-
the Teal Court's paramount concern. Moreover, if blacks as a group
tended to score higher on the oral portion of the exam, thus offsetting
the lower written exam scores and resulting in a final selection of
whites and blacks proportional to their labor force representation, a
prima facie case would still be established due to Teal's rejection of
the bottom line defense.
54
Although post-Teal courts may begin examining individual ex-
amination questions, their responsibilities will not differ radically
from the current practice. If a single question does have a discrimi-
natory effect and no other question offsets that effect, the overall hir-
ing figures will manifest the disparity. In order to avoid liability, the
employer will have to prove that the question is job-related, certainly
a less burdensome task than establishing the job-relatedness of an
entire exam. One must also remember that in order to establish that
a requirement has a disparate impact, the plaintiff must produce sta-
tistically significant evidence of such an effect; the mere fact that one
or two members of a protected group incorrectly answer a question
will generally not be considered statistically significant.
55
C. Procedures Only Applicable to Protected Group Members
The effect of Teal on an employment procedure which only ap-
plies to members of minority groups or women was recently consid-
ered by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in
Costa v. Markey.56 Costa involved a police department requirement
that all police officers be at least five feet six inches tall. In need of a
female officer to perform special duties related to women prisoners,
the city hired a woman from the eligibility list who met the height
457 U.S. at 463 n.8 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). His assertion is puzzling
because, as noted, the majority did not emphasize the barrier's pass-fail nature.
54 See Wilmore v. City of Wilmington, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 2, 9 (3d Cir.
1983). One of the prime fears of the courts which accepted the bottom line defense was that
"[tlo examine each component of an entire application process . . . launches a court on a
course that has no boundaries and no clear end." Brown v. New Haven Civil Serv. Bd., 474
F. Supp. 1256, 1262 (D. Conn. 1979). Challenges could be made to any subtest of a subtest,
and at the extreme this process "would require the elimination of individual questions
marked by poorer performance by a racial group." Smith v. Troyan, 520 F.2d 492, 498 (6th
Cir. 1975).
55 See Wright v. National Archives and Records Serv., 609 F.2d 702, 712 (4th Cir. 1979);
Adams v. Reed, 567 F.2d 1283, 1287 (5th Cir. 1978); Morita v. Southern Cal. Permanente
Med. Group, 541 F.2d 217, 219-20 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1050 (1977).
56 677 F.2d 158 (1st Cir.), rev'd, 706 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1982), rev'd, 706 F.2d 1, 10 (1st Cir.)
(en banc), cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3461 (U.S. Dec. 13, 1983) (No. 83-295).
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requirement.5 7 Plaintiff's name had appeared first on the eligibility
list, but she was rejected because she failed to meet the height re-
quirement. Costa sued the city, employing a disparate impact theory
of discrimination. 58 She produced evidence that 80 percent of the
male population is at least five feet six inches tall, while less than 20
percent of the female population meets that height requirement. 59
Although the district court found the defendant had violated
Title VII,6° the First Circuit intially reversed.6' The court of appeals
concluded that the situation did "not reveal a hiring that has a dis-
proportionately adverse impact on the relevant minority labor
pool" 62 and hence no prima facie case was established. After the
Supreme Court's decision in Teal, however, the First Circuit granted
rehearing of Costa. Noting that "Teal teaches that the proper place
to evaluate the strength of a Title VII plaintiffs prima facie case of
disparate impact discrimination is the point at which the employer's
neutral criterion has a discriminatory effect, ' 63 the First Circuit re-
versed itself and agreed that a prima facie case had been proved.
The court added that the "focus must be on the first step in the em-
ployment process that produces an adverse impact on a group pro-
tected by Title VII, not the end result of the employment process as a
whole."r' 4 Finally, the fact that the city only hired women was no
defense to a prima facie disparate impact case, according to the First
Circuit.
65
Rehearing en banc was then granted in Costa, and in a decision
dated May 23, 1983, a majority of the First Circuit concluded that
Teal did not require reversal of its original determination because the
"plaintiff ha[d] not made out a prima facie case of disparate im-
57 LeBoeufv. Ramsey, 503 F. Supp. 747, 752 (D. Mass. 1980). After the litigation began,
plaintiff Lynda LeBoeuf changed her name to Lynda Costa.
58 Id. at 765.
59 Id. at 753. Similar evidence was sufficient in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321
(1977), to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact.
60 503 F. Supp. at 756.
61 Costa v. Markey, 677 F.2d 158 (1st Cir. 1982).
62 Id. at 161-62.
63 706 F.2d 1, 4 (lst Cir. 1982).
64 Id. at 4-5. The court further noted that to establish a prima facie case a plaintiff need
not use "statistics from the actual application of a neutral rule." Additionally, in this case
national statistics accurately reflected the effect of the rule on the employer's labor pool. Id
at 5.
65 The court characterized the city's conduct as seeking to "justify the disparate effect of
the rule in general by pointing to the end results of one particular application of the rule.
[That] is the 'bottom line' approach which is proscribed by Teal." Id
[Vol. 59:313]
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pact. '66 Stating that Teal did not apply "in the absence of a discrim-
inatory effect,"' 67  the court found that because "the height
requirement was applied to women only, it could have had no dispa-
rate effect on women."
'68
Teal and Costa are clearly distinguishable. In Teal, the examina-
tion undeniably had a disparate effect on black applicants competing
for the supervisory positions. In Costa, because the only eligible indi-
viduals were women, the height requirement did not have a dispa-
rate effect on women in general, but rather a disparate effect on
women who were less than five feet six inches tall. In every instance
in which the Supreme Court has found a prima facie case of dispa-
rate impact discrimination, the group adversely affected was compet-
ing with its opposite racial or sexual group for the positions in
question.69 But such was not the case in Costa. Additionally, the
Costa facts are analytically quite similar to General Electric Co. v. Gil-
bert,70 which involved an employer's exclusion of pregnancy from dis-
ability insurance coverage. There the plan, on its face, did not
discriminate against women, according to the Court (just as the hir-
ing procedure in Costa did not facially discriminate against women),
and the Court concluded there was no discriminatory effect because
the benefit package was not "in fact worth more to men than to wo-
men. '7 1 Similarly, one cannot argue that the height requirement in
Costa was more beneficial to men than to women; rather, it was more
beneficial to tall women.
66 Costa v. Markey, 706 F.2d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 1983) (en banc).
67 Id. at 12.
68 Id. The First Circuit distinguished Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602
(9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 1534 (1983), which had concluded that an airline vio-
lated Title VII by imposing a weight limitation on flight attendants, all of whom were wo-
men. Id The Gerdom court specifically relied on disparate treatment analysis, concluding
that the requirement was designed to apply only to women and was therefore "facially dis-
criminatory." 692 F.2d at 608.
69 See New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979); Dothard v. Rawlin-
son, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Malarkey v. Tex-
aco, Inc., 704 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1983); Gerdorn v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602, 612
(9th Cir. 1982)(Farris, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1534 (1983); EEOC v. Greyhound
Lines, 635 F.2d 188, 194 (3d Cir. 1980)("When the Supreme Court has found illegal discrimi-
nation on the basis of an employer's use of a test or physical requirement to screen applicants,
it invariably has compared the impact of the test or qualification on the majority with its
impact on the minority alleging discrimination.").
70 429 U.S. 125 (1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 1079 (1977).
71 Id. at 138.
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D. Remedies For Proved Discrimination
In a number of instances employers found guilty of Title VII
violations have been ordered not only to eliminate the discriminatory
procedures, but also to hire or promote a specified number or per-
centage of the group whom the discrimination adversely affected,
without regard to whether those specific group members were actu-
ally subjected to discrimination. 72 The Teal majority emphasized
that Title VII is designed to protect the "individual employee,"
73
and the Court reiterated its original statement in City of Los Angeles
Department of Water and Power v. Manhart,74 that the " 'statute's focus
on the individual is unambiguous.' ,,75 However, some have argued
that because Title VII is designed to protect individuals only, group-
wide relief to non-identifiable victims is inappropriate. 76 Since the
Teal Court's statements regarding the individualized focus of Title
VII arose in the context of the requirements for a prima facie case,
however, that language is irrelevant to a discussion of the proper
remedy for proved discrimination. Trial courts must have broad dis-
cretion in fashioning relief to adequately further the Act's purpose.
Title VII "was enacted against a background of hundreds of years of
racism and racial violence and represents a congressional determina-
tion that continued discrimination in employment is against the pub-
lic interest. ' 77 This history of discrimination will continue to haunt
us unless active steps are taken to alter it. Finally, broad relief is
entirely appropriate in light of United Steelworkers v. Weber's accept-
ance of affirmative action plans for non-victims.
78
IV. A New Wrinkle in the Disparate Impact/Disparate
Treatment Dichotomy?
The Teal Court's substantial reliance on the literal language of
section 703(a) (2) marks a significant departure from its previous deci-
sions. In no other Title VII case has the Court gone to such great
72 See, e.g., Boston Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher, 679 F.2d 965 (1st Cir. 1982), vacated and
remandedfor consideration of mootness sub nom. Boston Firefighters Union, Local 718 v. Boston
Chapter, NAACP, 103 S. Ct. 2076, vacated as moot sub noma. Boston Chapter, NAACP v.
Beecher, 716 F.2d 931 (lst Cir. 1983); United States v. Elevator Constructors Local 5, 538
F.2d 1012 (3d Cir. 1976); Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974).
73 Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. at 453.
74 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
75 457 U.S. at 455 (quoting Manhart, 435 U.S. at 708).
76 See N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1983, at D20; N.Y. Times, June 7, 1983, at A18.
77 Brodin, The Standard ofCausation in the Mied-Motive Title VIIAction: A Social Policy Per-
spective, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 292, 319 (1982).
78 See note 33 supra.
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lengths to base its holding on the specific words of either section
703(a)(1) or section 703(a)(2), 79 the provisions outlawing discrimina-
tion. Curiosity and speculation concerning the Court's new ap-
proach are fueled by Justice Brennan's footnoted remark that if
section 703(a)(1) "were the only protection given to employees and
applicants under Title VII, [it] might support [the employer's] exclu-
sive focus on the overall result."80 Does a majority of the Court per-
ceive a substantive difference between the protections which section
703(a)(1) and section 703(a)(2) afford; and thus may disparate im-
pact cases only be pursued under section 703(a)(2), or was Justice
Brennan's opinion merely demonstrating how strongly the disparate
impact analysis is supported by the literal language of Title VII? A
review of prior Title VII decisions suggests that the Court's members
have not agreed on a unified view of the section 703(a)(1) and
703(a)(2) provisions. Moreover, as the Teal discussion of section
703(a) (2) is not entirely consistent with this precedent, it may create
new analytical difficulties for Title VII cases.
Grzggs v. Duke Power Co. ,8 the Court's initial interpretation of
Title VII, dealt with the question of whether an employer is prohib-
ited from requiring either a high school diploma or an acceptable
test score as a condition of employment when either procedure has a
disparate impact on blacks. The Court's opinion began with a foot-
note reference to section 703(a)(2),82 and a statement that "[t]he ob-
jective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from the
language of the statute. ' 83 But the Court then proceeded to discuss
the concept of discrimination generally and made no further refer-
ence to any statutory language.
8 4
The next three Title VII cases, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green ,85
Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing,86 and McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Trans-
79 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976). Section 703(a)(1) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . (1) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national
origin . ..
See note 18 supra for the text of § 703(a) (2).
80 457 U.S. 448 n.9.
81 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
82 Id. at 426 n.1.
83 Id. at 429.
84 Despite the limited reference in Grt'gs to § 703(a)(2), Teal characterized Gn'ggs as
"[re'ying on § 703(a) (2)." 457 U.S. at 448 (emphasis added).
85 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
86 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
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portation Co. ,87 were analyzed as disparate treatment cases. In all
three decisions, the Court merely cited section 703(a) (1) and made no
mention of section 703(a) (2).
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert8 represents the first instance in
which any member of the Court indicated that a different analytical
approach might be appropriate for sections 703(a)(1) and 703(a)(2).
As discussed earlier, the case involved a non-occupational sickness
and disability plan which excluded pregnancy-related disabilities.
Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist advanced the view that
sections 703(a) (1) and 703(a) (2) may not be used interchangeably to
combat discrimination. The disability policy was apparently re-
viewed under both the disparate treatment and disparate impact the-
ories. Justice Rehnquist's disparate treatment analysis rejected the
notion that the coverage exclusion constituted sex discrimination be-
cause he maintained that there was a "'lack of identity between the
excluded disability and gender as such.' "89 In his view, " 'the pro-
gram divide[d] potential recipients into two groups-pregnant wo-
men and non-pregnant persons. While the first group is exclusively
female, the second includes members of both sexes.'"90 Justice
Rehnquist then seemed to recognize that even if the disability pro-
gram was characterized as gender-neutral, the plan might still violate
Title VII if it had a disparate impact on women.9' However, the
opinion continued: "Even assuming that it is not necessary in this
case to prove intent to establish a prima facie violation of section
703 (a) (1). .. the respondents have not made the requisite showing of
gender-based effects."'92 Thus, Gilbert suggests that discriminatory in-
tent is required to prove a section 703(a)(1) violation and that dis-
parate impact analysis would not be appropriate under that
provision. Justice Rehnquist espoused this viewpoint again in his
Dothard v. Rawlinson93 dissent.
87 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
88 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
89 429 U.S. at 135 (quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 497 n.20 (1974)).
90 Id.
91 Justice Rehnquist stated:
[I]n the context of a challenge, under the provisions of § 703 (a) (2) to a facially neu-
tral employment test, this Court held that a prima facie case of discrimination
would be established if, even absent proof of intent, the consequences of the test
were "invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible
classification."
Id. at 137 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 431 (1971)).
92 Id. at 137.
93 433 U.S. 321 (1977). This decision was rendered one year after Gilbert; it was a dis-
parate impact case. In Dothard, Justice Rehnquist stated that "the statistics relied upon in
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The majority opinion in Nashville Gas Co. v. Salty,9 4 also written
by Justice Rehnquist, highlighted a potential substantive distinction
between sections 703(a)(1) and 703(a)(2), and added an additional
wrinkle to the analysis. The employer in Satty had a policy of not
allowing sick pay to employees on pregnancy leave and denying wo-
men employees returning from pregnancy leave their accrued senior-
ity. Attempting to distinguish GeneralElectric Co. v. Gilbert,95 he stated
that in Gilbert, "there was no showing that General Electric's policy
. . . favored men over women. No evidence was produced to suggest
that men received more benefits . . . than did women .... 96 The
employer in Satty, however, did "not merely [refuse] to extend to wo-
men a benefit that men cannot and do not receive, but [had] imposed
on women a substantial burden that men need not suffer."' 97 In Salty,
Justice Rehnquist reiterated his view that section 703(a)(2) was ap-
propriate for disparate impact claims, and he added the notion that
a policy which could be characterized as a deprivation of benefits
was not appropriate for a disparate impact analysis.98
Few other Supreme Court justices have focused their attention
on the scope of either section 703(a)(1) or section 703(a)(2). Those
who have commented on the issue have not devoted a great deal of
attention to it. In apparent contradiction of the view he espoused in
Teal, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, wrote a dissent in
this case are sufficient . ..to sustain a finding of a prima facie violation of § 703(a)(2), in
that they reveal a significant discrepancy between the numbers of men, as opposed to women,
who are automatically disqualified by reason of the height and weight requirements." 433
U.S. at 337-38 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
94 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
95 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
96 434 U.S. at 141.
97 Id. at 142. "We held in Gilbert that § 703(a)(1) did not require that greater economic
benefits be paid to one sex or the other . .. [b]ut that holding does not allow us to read
§ 703(a)(2) to permit an employer to burden female employees in such a way as to deprive
them of employment opportunities .. " Id
98 When discussing the exclusion of pregnancy from the sick leave plan in Satty, Justice
Rehnquist explained:
We again need not decide whether, when confronted by a facially neutral plan, it is
necessary to prove intent to establish a prima facie violation of § 703(a)(1). ...
But it is difficult to perceive how exclusion of pregnancy from a disability insurance
plan or sick-leave compensation program "would deprive any individual of employ-
ment opportunities" or "otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee" in
violation of § 703(a)(2). The direct effect of the exclusion is merely a loss of income
for the period the employee is not at work; such an exclusion has no direct effect
upon either employment or job status. Plaintiff's attack in Gilbert ...was brought
under § 703(a)(1), which would appear to be the proper section of Title VII under




Gilbert stating, "this Court. . .and every Court of Appeals now have
firmly settled that a prima facie violation of Title VII, whether under
section 703(a)(1) or section 703(a)(2), also is established by demon-
strating that a facially neutral classification has the e~fect of discrimi-
nating against members of a defined class." 99 When Justice Brennan
authored the majority opinion in United Steelworkers of America v.
Weber,' 00 he quoted both section 703(a)(1) and section 703(a)(2).10 1
Yet only in Teal has there been substantial reliance on statutory lan-
guage as a basis for the Court's decision.
Is the concern about Teal's reliance on the language of section
703(a) (2), and the Court's acknowledgment that exclusive considera-
tion of section 703(a)(1) might have led to a different result, much
ado about nothing? At first glance it appears that any problems
could be resolved by merely alleging violations of both section
703(a)(1) and section 703(a)(2) in the complaint. Nevertheless, by
requiring such inclusive reference to statutory authority the Court is
backing itself into an analytical corner from which escape may prove
difficult.
If disparate treatment cases are to be analyzed under both sec-
tions, but disparate impact cases only under section 703 (a) (2), how
does one treat a case like Weber, in which a white employee was
passed over for special training in favor of a less senior black em-
ployee? Brian Weber surely was "discriminated against," but was
the discrimination "with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions or privileges of employment" under section 703(a)(1), or did it
constitute a "limit .. .which would deprive . . . [him] of employ-
ment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status" under
section 703(a)(2)? Similarly, how should cases of sexual harassment
be analyzed? The discriminatory conduct might be considered dis-
crimination in terms, conditions or privileges of employment, or pos-
sibly as a limitation adversely affecting employee status. 0 2 The
analytical distinction between sections 703(a)(1) and 703(a)(2) will
undoubtedly create confusion and undermine the true purpose of Ti-
tle VII.
The potential for confusion was amply demonstrated in a recent
case from the Fifth Circuit, Carpenter v. Stephen F Austin State Univer-
99 429 U.S. at 153-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(emphasis added).
100 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
101 443 U.S. at 199 n.2.
102 See, e.g., Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d
983 (D.C. Cir. 1977); EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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sio-.
1 0 3 Plaintiffs brought suit against the university alleging race and
sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. They claimed that racial
and sexual stratification of employees in the lower pay brackets re-
sulted from "institutional employment practices that produce these
disparities and adversely affect blacks and women."
10 4
The district court concluded that the employer had violated
Title VII by "channeling" minorities and women into low-level
jobs.105 This illegal channeling included "educational qualifications
for job assignment and promotion that were not proved to be related
to job performance; systematic lower compensation of the class by
rates set in the Classification Pay Plan; and the University's subjec-
tivity in initially assigning and promoting employees and placing
them on the compensation scale."
10 6
Reviewing the district court's decision in Carpenter, the Fifth Cir-
cuit acknowledged that a Title VII class action may be brought
under either the disparate treatment or disparate impact theory.
10 7
The court explained that "[t]he disparate treatment model is based on
section 703(a)(1) of Title VII. . .[and] [t]he disparate impact model
of Title VII liability is based on section 703(a) (2) . . .108 The ap-
pellate court agreed that the disparate impact analysis was appropri-
ate for the educational requirements in Carpenter. The other
practices, however, should have been examined under the disparate
treatment model, according to the Fifth Circuit. 109 Yet the court rec-
ognized that
were this a case of first impression ...we would likewise have
concluded that the other channeling practices likewise fell clearly
under the disparate impact model, under the literal terms of
§ 703(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2), since they 'limit,
segregate, or classify' employees in a manner that 'would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee' because of
race or sex.
110
103 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1758 (5th Cir. 1983).
104 Id. at 1763.
105 Id. at 1766.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 1767.
108 Id. at 1767 n.7 (emphasis added).
109 Id. at 1767-68.
110 Id. (emphasis added). The court reached this conclusion by following the 1982 Fifth
Circuit decision of Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co., 668 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1982), which held
that
a subjective classification practice that depends on the employer's discretionar' deci-
sions is not included within the category of facially neutral procedures . . . whose
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The Fifth Circuit thus remanded the case to the district court for a
determination of whether the employer had discriminatory intent to
cause the latter two channeling practices, and thus whether viola-
tions of Title VII occurred.' 1
The disturbing aspect of Carpenter is the court's rigid categoriza-
tion of disparate treatment cases as only those falling within the lit-
eral language of section 703(a)(1), and disparate impact cases as only
those which come under the strict terms of section 703(a)(2). The
court, was absolutely correct in observing that if the employer's
workforce was racially and sexually stratified, it constituted a
"limit[ation], segregat[ion], or classif[ication]"'12 that would deprive
individuals of employment opportunities because of sex or race.
1 1 3
Yet the court concluded that section 703(a) (2) could not be used as a
basis for a Title VII violation because section 703 (a) (2) pertains only
to' disparate impact cases and the practices in question were not ap-
propriate for disparate impact analysis. 14
Equally disturbing is the Ninth Circuit's May 1983 decision,
Wambheim v. j. C Penney Co. 115 The Wambheim plaintiffs challenged
Penney's medical insurance policy under which employees who
worked at least twenty hours each week were offered medical and
dental insurance. Penney paid approximately 75 percent of the pro-
gram's cost. Various contribution rates were based on whether the
employee alone was covered, or whether a spouse and/or dependents
were also covered. 
1 6
In conjunction with the plan, Penney imposed a head-of-house-
hold rule which allowed an employee to obtain coverage for a spouse
only if the employee earned more than half of the couple's combined
income. Seventy percent of Penney's workforce was female, but
"most of these women work[ed] in low-paying sales positions."' 1 7
Unremarkably, "only 12.5 percent of the married female employees
qualified as heads of households, while 89.34 percent of the married
discriminatory impact may be isolated and thus. . . shown to have a causal connec-
tion to a class-based imbalance in the work force so as to require no further proof of
discriminatory motivation or intent.
31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1768 (emphasis in original).
111 Id. at 1768-69.
112 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1976).
113 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1767-68.
114 Id.
115 705 F.2d 1492 (9th Cir. 1983).
116 Id at 1493.
117 Id
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males qualified."1 18
In an earlier proceeding, the Ninth Circuit determined that the
plaintiffs had established a prima facie case of disparate impact dis-
crimination. 1 9 But in its May opinion, the court characterized
Wambheim as "an unusual disparate impact case because it alleges a
violation of § 703(a)(1) of the Act: discrimination with respect to
'compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.' ",120
The court then asserted that "[t]he disparate impact theory has been
developed in cases alleging violations of § 703(a)(2),"1 21 and dis-
cussed whether that theory was appropriate in a section 703(a)(1)
case. The court concluded that it was.
122
That conclusion did not turn the court's attention away from
the distinction between sections 703(a)(1) and 703 (a) (2), however, for
the court stated that once the plaintiffs had established a prima facie
case of disparate impact the "burden. . . shifted to Penney to justify
its policy."'1 23 The court recited the standard of proof for a section
703(a)(2) case: "business necessity"; "manifest relationship to the
employment in question"; or "necessity for the efficient operation of
the business," 124 but chose not to employ any of those standards. In-
stead, it asserted that because none of those measures is particularly
applicable to the section § 703(a)(1) employment benefits case, "Pen-
ney must 'demonstrate that legitimate and overriding business con-
siderations provide justification.' ",125 Applying that standard, the
court found that Penney had met its burden. Penney explained that
the head-of-household rule "is designed to benefit the largest number
of employees and those with the greatest need,"' 26 and added that
"[i]f all spouses are included, the contribution rates will increase."127
118 Id at 1494.
119 642 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1981).
120 705 F.2d at 1494.
121 Id
122 Id As support for its conclusion, the Ninth Circuit stated: "A recent decision of [the
United States Supreme Court] ... implies that disparate impact analysis may be applied to
a § 703(a)(I) claim." Id (citing American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63 (1982)).
Patterson involved the issue of whether the operation of a seniority system, which had its origin
after Title VII's effective date and which had a disparate impact on blacks, would establish a
violation of that Act despite the absence of proof of an intent to discriminate. The Court held
it would not. It is difficult to discern the basis for the Wambheim court's view of Patterson.
123 705 F.2d at 1494 (footnote omitted).
124 Id at 1495 (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 431; Connecticut v. Teal, 102
S. Ct. at 2531; and Peters v. Lieuallen, 693 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1982)).
125 705 F.2d at 1495 (emphasis added) (quoting Bonilla v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 697





These bare assertions were sufficient to establish the employer's "le-
gitimate and overriding business justifications."'' 28
Thus, given the Teal Court's endorsement of an analytical dis-
tinction between section 703 (a)(1) and 703(a) (2) cases, the Ninth Cir-
cuit in Wambheim seized the opportunity to create a new standard for
rebutting a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination.
While it is difficult to discern whether the phrase "legitimate and
overriding business considerations" is an easier burden for defend-
ants to meet than "business necessity," the Wambheim court's applica-
tion of the standard was certainly not stringent.
Perhaps an even more important implication of the section
703(a) (1)/703(a) (2) dichotomy involves federal government employ-
ees. They are protected against discrimination by section 717 of Ti-
tle VII, which provides in part: "[a]ll personnel actions . . . shall be
made free from any discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin."' 29 Although that language is not very similar to
either section 703(a)(1) or 703(a)(2), it is probably closer to section
703(a) (1) because of the reference to "discrimination." If the distinc-
tion between the sections prevails, will this analysis prevent federal
government employees from basing lawsuits on the disparate impact
theory because section 717, like section 703(a)(1), will now be inter-
preted to require proof of intent to discriminate? Surely such a result
would undermine congressional intent. The legislative history sur-
rounding the 1972 amendments to Title VII, which extended the Act
to state and federal employees, clearly indicates that pre-1972 deci-
sions, including Grzggs v. Duke Power Co. ,130 were to become applica-
ble to the newly covered employees. 131 Indeed, the Court itself
observed, in Chandler v. Roudebush :132
A principal goal of. . . the Equal Employment Opportunity Act
of 1972 . . . was to eradicate 'entrenched discrimination in the
Federal Service'. . . by strengthening internal safeguards and by
according '[a]ggrieved [federal] employees or applicants. . . the
full rights available in the courts as are granted to individuals in
the private sector under Title VII. ' 133
128 Id
129 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (1976).
130 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
131 See S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 5 (1971); see also H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprintedin 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2137; 118 CONG. REC.
7166, 7564 (1972).
132 425 U.S. 840 (1976).
133 Id. at 841 (citation omitted).
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There is no basis in logic or legislative history for distinguishing
between a section 703(a)(1) and 703(a)(2) disparate impact claim.
Congress clearly intended to outlaw discrimination in employment,
and in the language of those two sections it provided examples of
illegal discrimination. There is no evidence that only section
703(a)(1) was intended to apply to instances of intentional discrimi-
nation, while section 703(a)(2) was to apply exclusively to disparate
impact cases. 134 Nor is there reasonable support for the idea that a
disparate impact analysis might not be appropriate for a situation
involving fringe benefits. Justice Stevens, concurring in Saty, acutely
observed that
differences between benefits and burdens cannot provide a mean-
ingful test of discrimination since, by hypothesis, the favored class
is always benefited and the disfavored class is equally burdened.
The grant of seniority is a benefit which is not shared by the
burdened class; conversely, the denial of sick pay is a burden
which the benefited class need not bear.
13 5
The Court seems to be suffering from the same type of construc-
tional weakness in its Title VII jurisprudence as that which plagued
it in cases arising under sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the National
Labor Relations Act.136 Section 8(a)(1) of that Act provides that it is
an unfair labor practice to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employ-
ees in the exercise of their protected rights.137 Section 8(a)(3) makes
it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate against an
employee, with regard to a term or condition of employment, to en-
courage or discourage union membership. 38  The Supreme Court
has struggled for a number of years with those sections, especially
134 Bernstein & Williams, Title Vlland the Problem of Sex Classifications in Pension Programs, 74
COLUM. L. REV. 1203, 1215 n.38 (1974); Gold, Equality of Opportunity in Retirement Funds, 9
Loy. L.A.L. REV. 596, 605-09 & n.61 (1976); See Rutherglen, Sexual Equality in Fringe-Benefit
Plans, 65 VA. L. REV. 199, 235 n.151 (1979).
135 Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 154 n.4 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring). Nor
does Justice Stevens perceive a difference between the protections of § 703(a)(1) and
§ 703(a) (2), for he wrote in Satty:
The Court's second apparent ground of distinction [between §§ (a) (1) and (a) (2)] is
equally unsatisfactory. The Court suggests that its analysis of the seniority plan is
different because the plan was attacked under § 703(a)(2) of Title VII, not
§ 703(a)(1). Again, I must confess that I do not understand the relevance of this
distinction. It is true that § 703(a)(1) refers to 'discrimination' and § 703(a)(2) does
not. But the Court itself recognizes that this is not significant since a violation of
§ 703(a)(2) occurs when a facially neutral policy has a 'discririnatory efect.'
Id (emphasis in original).
136 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1976).
137 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976).
138 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976).
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regarding the questions of what "discriminate" means,139 and
whether it is necessary to prove an intention or motive to interfere
with, restrain, coerce or discriminate, in order to establish a viola-
tion. 14° Although the Court's 1967 decision in NLRB v. Great Dane
Trailers, Inc. 141 appeared finally to resolve the latter issue, the prob-
lem resurfaced in NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp. 142 Prior to
Teal, Title VII precedent appeared to be developing in a fashion
consistent with maximizing the statute's purpose. Teal foreshadows
the unfortunate likelihood that the Court will repeat its NLRA his-
tory, spending precious years myopically adhering to specific statu-
tory language in deciding its employment discrimination cases.
Both section 703(a) (1) and section 703(a) (2) should be construed
to prohibit discrimination, whether it occurs in the form of disparate
treatment or any practice which has a disparate impact on members
of a protected group. To interpret the statutory language in a for-
malistic fashion disregards the congressional objective underlying Ti-
tle VII: "to achieve equality of employment opportunities."'
' 43
V. Conclusion
Pragmatically, Teal is a mixed blessing for women and minori-
139 See generaly Christensen & Svanoe, Motive and Intent in the Commission of Unfair Labor
Practices: The Supreme Court and the Fictive Formality, 77 YALE LJ. 1269 (1968); Oberer, The
Scienter Factor in Sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Labor Act.- Of Balancing, Hostile Motive, Dogs and
Tails, 52 CORNELL L. REv. 491 (1967).
140 See, e.g., NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967); American Ship Build-
ing Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965); NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965); Textile Work-
ers Union ofAmerica v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965); NLRB v. Burnup & Sims,
Inc., 379 U.S. 21 (1964); NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405 (1964); NLRB v. Erie
Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
141 388 U.S. 26 (1967). The Court described two types of § 8(a)(3) violations in Great
Dane. The first type involves conduct by the employer which is "inherently destructive of
employee interests." 388 U.S. at 33. If inherently destructive conduct is established, "the
Board need not adduce independent evidence of motivation,. . . the employer has the bur-
den ofjustifying its actions, and, even if such justifications are adduced, the Board neverthe-
less may strike the balance in favor of employee rights and against the employer's asserted
business purpose." Jackson & Heller, The Irrelevance of the Wght Line Debate.: Retuning to the
Realism of Erie Resistor in Unfair Labor Practice Cases, 77 Nw. U.L. REv. 737, 768 (1983). The
second category of § 8(a)(3) violations involves conduct which has a comparatively slight
impact on employee interests. 388 U.S. at 34. "When the impact of the employer's discrimi-
natory conduct is comparatively slight, and the employer has come forward with legitimate
and substantial business justification, affirmative evidence must establish anti-union motiva-
tion. Absent proof of legitimate business justification. . . a violation is established." Jackson
& Heller, supra, at 768-69.
142 103 S.Ct. 2469 (1983).
143 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,429-30 (1971). See also The Supreme Court, 1981
Term, 96 HARV. L. REv. 62, 282-83, 285 (1982).
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ties. Those employers who are still committed to using tests for em-
ployment decisions may now expend their funds on test validation
rather than on affirmative action programs. 144 Yet the Teal decision
does not completely abrogate the bottom line defense in Title VII
cases. The Supreme Court acknowledged that the EEOC Guidelines
on Employee Selection Procedures handle the bottom line as a tool of
administrative discretion, not as a rule of law. The EEOC may
therefore choose not to bring a cause of action against an employer
whose hiring and promotion procedures reflect no discrimination at
the bottom line.
4 5
Teal does represent an important step in the evolution of Title
VII, however. The employees' ability to contest more barriers to em-
ployment opportunities should finally convince employers that their
requirements must be absolutely necessary for adequate job perform-
ance. By refusing to accept the bottom line defense, the Supreme
Court has reiterated its commitment to true equality in employment
opportunities. One can only hope that Teal's weaknesses do not over-
whelm its basic, laudable contribution to Title VII jurisprudence.
144 Bartosic & Minda, supra note 51, at 283-84; Irvin, Erasing the "Bottom Lie": Connecticut
v. Teal, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 175, 181 (1983).
145 See text accompanying note 24 supra. Of course, an individual or individuals may
pursue a cause of action just as the Teal plaintiffs.
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